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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

(322)

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ACTION OES-09

INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-15	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-08	EA-12	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NEA-07	NSC-05
	NSAE-00	L-03	DOE-10	PM-02	SSM-05	SMS-01	SAL-01
	ACDA-12	SSN-02	SP-02	DOEE-00	NRC-02	/144 W	

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P 151245Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6781
INFO USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY JL DATE 9/30/08
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☐ RELEASABLE☒
RELEASE DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

UNCLAS PARIS 17672

USEC, USIAEA

E.O. 12065: NA
TAGS: TNUC, MNUC, PARM, ENRG, SCSA, FR, IZ
SUBJ: FRENCH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CEA) PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON TAMUZ (OSIRAK) REACTOR

1. THE CEA ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE OSIRAK REACTOR. (INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION).

2. QUOTE: FOLLOWING INACCURATE STATEMENTS REGARDING A RISK THAT THE TAMUZ REACTOR COULD BE USED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE COMMISSARIAT FOR ATOMIC ENERGY STRESSES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. ACCORDING TO TWO INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS: THE FRENCH-IRAQI AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18, 1975 AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO WHICH IRAQ ADHERED, IRAQ IS COMMITTED TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF THE TAMUZ REACTOR.

B. THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE COMMITMENTS IS GUARANTEED BY THE SAFEGUARDS CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY COVERING ALL IRAQI NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET REACTOR WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATIONAL IN THE SAME CENTER FOR SEVERAL YEARS. AS CONFIRMED RECENTLY BY IAEA, THESE SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS ARE TAKING PLACE IN SPITE OF THE STATE OF WAR.

C. MOREOVER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR THIS REACTOR IS CARRIED OUT JOINTLY BY FRENCH AND IRAQI TEAMS.

D. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH AND THE TRAINING OF PERSONNEL. ANY ATTEMPT TO USE THEM FOR THE PRODUCTION AND THE DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES WOULD NECESSITATE IMPORTANT CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS AS PLANNED AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT ESCAPE CONTROL.

E. EVEN ASSUMING THE EXTREME CASE OF A SIMULTANEOUS BREAKING OF ALL COMMITMENTS AND OF SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS, THE RESULTING IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLY WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF FISSILE MATERIALS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

3. FURTHERMORE, THIS TYPE OF REACTOR, WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR RESEARCH, IS VERY BADLY SUITED FOR THE PRODUCTION AND DIVERSION OF CONCENTRATED MATERIALS.

4. IN THIS RESPECT, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE CALCULATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS WERE DRAWN FROM ACCURATE PHYSICAL DATA, THEY ARE UNREALISTIC BECAUSE THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE NEUTRON BALANCE AND BY THE MECHANICAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SYSTEM.

5. IN ANY CASE, THERE HAS BEEN NO EXAMPLE IN THE WORLD OF SUCH DIVERSION WITH THIS TYPE OF REACTOR. IN THIS REGARD, THIS DIFFERS FROM THOSE WHICH, USING NATURAL URANIUM (WITH HEAVY WATER OR GRAPHITE-GAS) AND CAN EASILY BE FUELLED CONTINUOUSLY AND HAVE BEEN, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MAIN SOURCE OF PRODUCTION OF MILITARY PLUTONIUM. END QUOTE. HARTMAN

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